Addressing these issues, the present paper elaborates fi rstly on the jurisdictional exemption of § 6 and its eff ect on the ICC, followed by a discussion of resulting challenges to the principle of legality, the principle of universal jurisdiction for international crimes, the equality of individuals before the law and the principle of independence of the court.
Introduction
On February 26 2011, the United Nations Security Council (SC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 2 referring the situation of Libya to the International
In this paper the following issues are being addressed: the legal eff ect of § 6 for the ICC followed by the conceptualization of jurisdiction of the ICC in practice, and discussing challenges to: (3.1) the Principle of Legality, (3.2.) the Principle of Universal jurisdiction, (3.3), the Principle of Equality of Individuals before the Law, and (3.4) the principle of independence of the International Criminal Court.
Jurisdictional Exemption of § 6 and the Rome Statute
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (Charter), the UN Security Council referred the situation concerning Libya to the International Criminal Court with the following exemption. Th e exemption included in operative § 6 of resolution 1970 (2011) reads in the relevant part:
[Th e Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations,…] Decides that nationals, current or former offi cials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;
14 Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court regulates SC referrals in its art 13(b) which provides:
Th e Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: […] (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; [...]
Th e jurisdictional exemption quoted seems hard to reconcile with the jurisdiction regime provided in art 13(b) of the Rome Statute.
As is clear from the legal considerations during the negotiation of article 13, the wording was specifi cally chosen to avoid referring only individual cases. Art 13 refers to 'situations' a word which was intended to avoid political interference by a 'pick and choose' approach, as evidenced by the draft ing history, during which the wording was changed from 'case' to 'matters' to 'situations' . 15 Indeed, also the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC has explained that this phrase means that 14 Th e exact same wording was included in § 6 of UNSC Res 1593 (n 4). Th us, the exemption for certain categories of nationals from the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to § 6 of the resolution appears to be in confl ict with the text of art 13(b) of the Statute. 18 While extensive debates elaborated on the legality and eff ect of § 6 following the Darfur referral, Resolution 1970 raises further questions, not least due to its unanimous adoption and the lack of subsequent criticism. 19 Such continued practice could point to developing acceptance or acquiescence of such troubling SC action.
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Th e following considerations apply to both Resolutions, and it is important to note that presently the impact of operative § 6 of Resolution was neither addressed by the Prosecutor, nor by the Chambers.
21 Th e Prosecutor in his Th ird Report to the UN Security Council concerning the situation in Libya, however, asserted without further explanation that " [t] he Offi ce does have a mandate, however, to investigate allegations of crimes by all actors"
22 not mentioning § 6 of the relevant Resolution.
Such developments therefore merit a closer look at these issues.
Security Council Referrals to the ICC
Most authors arrive at the conclusion that § 6 leaves obligations of state parties to the ICC in confl ict with their obligations under the UN Charter
23
. 24 Furthermore, it is sometimes asserted that legally, the Security Council referral can only activate the Rome Statute as a whole, not select parts thereof. 25 It is further assumed that these exemption clauses would not withstand judicial scrutiny in the court itself, which under art 19(1) RS shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. It is important that these and the underlying assumptions of any such legal conclusions must be carefully analysed. Before turning to the specifi cs of § 6, the preliminary question regarding the conception of criminal jurisdiction exercised by the ICC must be addressed however. Only aft er conceptualizing the jurisdiction regime provided for SC referrals we can turn to the question of its legal eff ects and challenges. It is a diff erent issue, however, when jurisdiction of the ICC is not delegated by the respective State but fi nds its basis in a UN SC resolution referring a case to the ICC, which is the case regarding the situation in Libya and Resolution 1970 (2011) .
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
While it is true that, by itself, the decision to confer jurisdiction to an international tribunal does not necessarily require the State concerned to do anything. Nevertheless, the State in question (here Libya) is legally bound (by virtue of the binding SC resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to accept that the ICC has jurisdiction in the circumstance in which the Security Council has conferred jurisdiction. 32 It follows then, that SC referrals concerning non-State parties to the ICC, the basis of the jurisdictional authority of the ICC is solely the SC resolution. Th is in turn means, that the extent and scope of jurisdiction conferred is determined entirely by the SC resolution and cannot be limited nor extended by provisions of the Rome Statute.
Th e questions regarding the scope of jurisdiction ratione loci, ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis must therefore be answered with recourse to the resolution including the referral (ie resolution 1970) as well as (implicitly) considering potential (implied) limits to the SC acting under Chapter VII stemming from the Charter. 33 Conceptually, this means that the referral allows the SC -within the framework of the limits of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations-to free the ICC from those limitations which otherwise derive from the fact that the ICC is created by an international treaty. 34 It cannot however, free the ICC from limita- On the other hand it is important to note that the ICC and its organs, as any other international organization, can only operate on the basis of its constituent treaty. 35 It is important to distinguish this question from the conclusion above that the SC is not limited by provisions of the Rome Statute.
In fact, while the UN Charter indeed asserts direct authority to restrict or compel actions, not just of UN Member States but also other international organizations in the case of regional arrangements or agencies dealing with regional issues of peace and security pursuant to Chapter VIII (arts 52, 53), the Charter nowhere does purport to authorize other international organizations to perform acts beyond their constitutent documents. 36 Th is is indeed very important to note for the following.
Th e ICC cannot be viewed as a ‚specialized agency' within the UN system. 37 Th is means that art 13(b) of the Rome Statute must be considered when answering the question whether this provision may be understood as making the SC referral powers of the SC operational for the Court. Th e view adopted here, follows a "Charter friendly" interpretation (encouraged by the Principle of Systemic Integration 38 However, regardless of what view one adopts on this issue, it is clear from the theory of delegation of jurisdictional authority, that the SC merely delegates criminal jurisdiction over the situation to the court. Since this is the only source of jurisdictional authority for the ICC, it cannot exercise more than what is provided for in the resolution. 44 Th e exact scope of the delegation of jurisdiction in question remains under the discretion of the SC, since the Court can only exercise such authority that is delegated to it.
As a result, the ICC is bound by the exemptions for certain categories of nationals as included in SC Resolution 1970 (2011) Assuming that the SC acts within its powers, interpretation of the resolution including the referral must then be conducted in light of potential limits to the SC with respect to referrals. Prima facie however, these resolutions must be considered intra vires. 45 Th is means that if the SC delegates a 'limited' authority the Court it cannot exercise more than that, regardless of the provisions of the Statute.
46 Th e Relationship Agreement concluded between the UN and the ICC, does not change this, since the SC is not bound by treaty law. 47 Th at this conclusion leads to serious challenges to principles of international criminal justice is addressed in the following section.
Challenges to Principles of International Criminal Justice

Challenges to the Principle of Legality
As enshrined in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the principle of legality to a large extent requires the formal approach adopted by the international criminal courts and tribunals with respect to sources of international law 48 . 49 Article 22 (1) of the Rome Statute itself provides for
A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
According to international jurisdprudence, the principle of legality "requires that the off ence with which an accused is charged was suffi ciently foreseeable and that the law providing for such liability was suffi ciently accessible to the accused at the relevant time." 50 It is suffi cient for those acts to be crimes under international law 51 which is applicable. 52 "An assessment of the foreseeability and accessibility requirements integral to the principle of legality should take into account the particular nature of international law, including its reliance on unwritten custom." 53 In case of resolution 1970 (2011) referring the situation concerning Libya to the ICC, the question is whether application of the elements of crimes contained in the Statute are to be considered retroactive application of crimes. Especially since the Rome Statute as a multilateral treaty, is creating law for the States parties to the treaty, it is diffi cult to see on what basis States outside of the treaty regime are bound by the defi nitions of international crimes included in the Statute.
In fact, academics and politicians alike refused to accept the International Law Commission's proposition not to defi ne crimes in the proposed Statute of the permanent ICC at a very early stage. 54 Rather it was referred to existing instruments, 55 because "[m]any felt that prosecutions in the proposed Court would run afoul of the nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege principle if crimes were not suffi ciently defi ned in advance."
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A similar problem arose with respect to the qualifi cation of the Nuremberg Trials. While arguably a rather theoretical debate concerning the Nuremberg Trials whether the substantive criminal law applied during the Nuremberg Trialso matched customary international law, 57 or only law among the parties to the London Agreement and the Nuremberg Charter, it is important in this regard. present customary international law 59 . 60 In fact, it has been pointed out that "states with military forces that operate abroad will fear that soldiers and their commanders, including the highest political authorities responsible for military activities, will be dragged in front of an international court for war crimes prosecution and will, at a minimum, be inconvenienced and embarrassed. Indeed, because the defi nitions of international crimes are so vague, soldiers and officials might fi nd themselves punished for activities that they consider legal and routine." 61 Th is ambiguity regarding the state of customary crimes under international law is further evidenced by the fact that the draft ers viewed it necessary to include art 10 into the Statute, which states that "[n]othing in this Part [defi nition of crimes] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute."
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Here the ICC Statute disclaims an intent to defi ne substantive international law, including substantive international criminal law, for anyone other than the international organization of the ICC itself.
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Specifi cally problematic is the fact that there is no international treaty defi ning crimes against humanity. Th e Preparatory Committee of the future ICC did not reach consensus regarding the exact defi nition of crimes against humanity. 64 Hence, art 7, defi ning crimes against humanity, may thus be regarded as creating an autonomous regime. 65 Another problematic issue concerns the Rome Statutes defi nition of war crimes, since the defi nitions regarding non-international armed confl ict, appear to depart from accepted international custom. It is clear however, that in cases where the State in question is bound to international treaties applicable, their application by the ICC does not pose issues of legality. Th e operation of such diff erences in the scope of jurisdiction ratione materae is ensured by art 10 (reference to customary international law) in connection with arts 21 (applicable law) and 19 (determination of jurisdiction) of the Rome Statute.
While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse the state of crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international law or whether the SC is even bound by the principle of legality with regards to international criminal law, 67 it is important to raise this issue for the sake of the prominent place the principle of legality occupies in international criminal law. And to persuade the Chambers of the ICC to address this issue. It shall be noted in this respect that the SC itself implicitly found to be bound by the principle of legality when it insisted that when establishing the ad hoc tribunals, it did not create new law but was merely applying existing law 68 . 69 As a result, in the case of resolution 1970 (2011) the ICC's jurisdiction is limited to adjudicate crimes recognized as part of customary international law. 73 Only the Brazilian representative stated: "However, we express our strong reservation concerning paragraph 6. We reiterate our conviction that initiatives aimed at establishing exemptions of certain categories of individuals from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are not helpful to advancing the cause of justice and accountability and will not contribute to strengthening the role of the Court" Verbatim Record (26 February In order to understand the underlying challenge Resolution 1970 poses to the principle of universal jurisdiction, one must clarify the concept. 74 Th e Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction defi nes universal jurisdiction as "criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction. " 75 It is generally accepted that the core international crimes included in the ICC Statute (ie crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes) are of such nature. 76 Since the exemption included in the Resolution provides that certain categories of nationals of States not party to the ICC "shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" 77 , any other States, including Libya the territorial state, therefore appear to be barred from exercising universal jurisdiction pursuant to this decision of the Security Council, which under Article 25 of the UN Charter is binding on all UN Member States and prevails over other confl icting international agreements (art 103 UN Charter). Accordingly, only the State of nationality shall have jurisdiction over their current or former offi cials or personnel. Clearly this provision was intended to shield US activity in Libya from ICC prosecution. However, what might have been overlooked is the fact that the SC resolution barrs any other State from exercising universal jurisdiction under certain circumstances. 78 Th at such exemptions are in confl ict with the spirit of the Rome Statute, is obvious when recalling its preamble stating "that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes". 79 It must also be noted that the exemptions of § 6 deviates from the principle of criminal jurisdiction based on territoriality. Crimes under the ICC statute are permissable claims for (state) jurisdiction for the territorial state, ie Libya. 80 Being one of the pillars of State sovereignty, criminal jurisdiction can only be waived under exceptional circumstances, for normally criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed within their boundaries is exercised by the state on whose territory they were committed. 81 However, the confl icting claims of criminal jurisdiction 82 (Libya on the principle of territoriality 83 and universal jurisdiction vs. US on nationality principle 84 ) appear to be ‚regulated ' by the SC Resolution. While beyond the scope of this paper, it is an interesting question whether the SC actually has the power to disregard this principle. Th at such exceptional measures are justifi ed in light of maintenance of international peace and security is very doubtful and further appears to delegitimizes the ICC's mandate in Libya.
Challenges to the Principle of Equality of Individuals before the Law
Th e exemption included in § 6 of resolutions 1593 and 1970 prescribe that nationals, current or former offi cials or personnel from a State outside the State concerned in the referral, which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State and are thus excluded from prosecution by the ICC. Such outright diff erentiation based solely on the nationality and their capacity as military personell of the person concerned seems hard to be justifi ed and appears to be at odds with art 27, providing for the irrelevance of any offi cial capacity. Another important element of this principle that is being violated here is that like situations shall be treated alike. 85 Th at some states' nationals are more equal than others 86 is thus incompatible with the principle of equality before the law-a principle that is recognized as a fundamental principle of justice. 87 Indeed, it is the very rationale of the establishment of the ICC that justice be administered equally, particularly that no one shall escape the rule of law (ie that there shall be no impunity for the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole).
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It is not clear, however, whether this principle is de lege lata part of and applies to international criminal jurisdiction of the ICC as well. One has to be reminded that the principle of universality as such is not a concept of the Rome Statute. 89 A proposal by the German and South Korean delegation 90 at the conference in Rome to delegate universal jurisdiction 91 to the Court was rejected. 92 As a result, the ICC's jurisdiction is inherently unequal in its applicability. And considering the accepted practice of excluding criminal jurisdiction for military forces stationed abroad eg. in status of armed forces on foreign territory agreements (SOFA) 93 , it appears to be rather doubtful that it attained status of customary international law.
Indeed, while defi nitely posing a challenge to the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, inequality seems to be inherent in the Rome Statute itself. 94 As one commentator observed, "[t]he Rome Statute is fl awed in that it does not ensure equal justice, but it was the best possible compromise given what was politically feasible at the time it was negotiated." 95 It seems then even more paradox, however, that the one instrument with which the ICC could dispense equal justice for all, i.e. through SC referrals, itself poses challenges to this principle.
Challenges to the Principle of Independence of the Court
Judicial independence is universally accepted in international criminal law 96 and guaranteed by art 40 of the Rome Statute. Further reiterating this principle, art 2 of the Relationship Agreement states that the court is an "independent permanent judicial institution". Th e questions raised by resolution 1970 and 1593 is then whether the exemption of certain categories of nationals from the jurisdiction of the court constitutes an interference by the SC with the conduct of individual cases and thus being contrary to the principle of independence. It is important to note that the principle of independence binds the SC, since the Council would otherwise violate article 1(1) of the Charter.
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Independence is understood as containing both an individual and institutional guarantee.
98 However, such guarantees do not cover diff erences of, or limitations to jurisdiction in cases of SC referrals, since such referrals are inherently selective. Th erefore, none of the elements the "Burgh House Principles On Th e Independence Of Th e International Judiciary" 99 put forward to ensure judicial independence, are violated in this respect.
It must be concluded that the SC Resolutions 1593 and 1970 do not violate the independence of the court, since the Court's independence pertaining to acts under its jurisdiction remains untouched.
However, it must be criticized insofar as the exemption of certain categories of nationals further restricts the scope within which the Court can ‚exercise' its independence. From the victim's perspective this is a rather technical argument responding to accusation of applying a double standard.
Th is is, de lege lata, a general feature of international law: of the few international courts that do posses compulsory jurisdiction, none have general competences. 
